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Abstract. Using a loan-level matched sample of Japanese banks and ﬁrms, we
examine what factors determine the termination of the bank-ﬁrm relationship. We
ﬁnd that terminations are mainly driven by bank factors, but such bank-driven ter-
minations increase when banks’ capital conditions worsen. The constraints on bank
capital in the Japanese banking crisis increased terminations, implying the presence
of a capital crunch. Moreover, “ﬂight-to-quality” behavior prevailed instead of “ever-
greening” in relationship terminations because of lowly capitalized banks’ motives to
reduce agency costs. We also ﬁnd that a longer relationship duration decreased the
probability of termination substantially when Japan’s banking system was stable, but
such duration eﬀects weakened when the system was fragile. Japan’s banking system
cultivated bank-ﬁrm relationships over many decades to lower agency costs gradually,
but this system malfunctioned partially in the ﬂight to quality, whereby many banks
could not aﬀord to maintain relationships with distressed borrowers irrespective of
duration.
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1. Introduction According to microeconomic banking theory emphasizing inside in-
formation obtained from long bank-ﬁrm relationships (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and
Von Thadden (1995)), maintaining relationships mitigates asymmetric information prob-
lems between banks and borrowing ﬁrms, but raises the problem of distortions in ﬁrms’
incentives to exert eﬀort because of the banks’ information monopoly. Therefore, if a bank
maintains a bank-ﬁrm relationship for a long period, in order to obtain a stream of rents
over time, the bank needs to control the ﬁrm’s incentives through measures such as monitor-
ing so that the ﬁrm exerts appropriate eﬀort.1 Against this theoretical backdrop, previous
empirical studies obtained two opposite conclusions; one emphasizes the hold-up problem
(e.g. Ongena and Smith (2001), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Ioannidou and Ongena
(2010)) and the other focuses on how relationship-speciﬁc assets can mitigate asymmetric
information problems (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995), Brau (2002), Miyakawa (2010), and
Sakai et al. (2010)).
Despite the coexistence of the two views, the increase in relationship terminations during
the Japanese banking crisis period in the late 1990s in Figure 1 suggests the importance
of lender-side factors in the termination of relationships with ﬁrms. Furthermore, the low
growth rate of the Japanese economy suggests that the relationship terminations aﬀected
the real economy through the destruction of the relationship-speciﬁc assets, which had been
cultivated by the banks’ commitment to continue their relationships.
The literature on microeconomic banking theory demonstrates that the relationship-
speciﬁc asset—an information-based implicit property right not available from outside
lenders—can help lower the agency cost for the inside bank, which helps it control the bor-
rower’s projects through monitoring and obtain rents over time. In addition, the literature
shows that the relationship-speciﬁc assets drive a wedge between the eﬀects of terminating
relationships and adjusting bank loans within relationships; put diﬀerently, the mechanism
of terminating relationships should be diﬀerent from adjusting loans within continuing re-
lationships. This is because the inside bank will abandon the relationship-speciﬁc assets
1 Concerning the evasion of the hold-up problem in long-term relationships, Sharpe (1990) emphasized
the role of implicit contracts based on the bank’s reputation and propensity to keep its promises, while
Rajan (1992) focused on the role of the ﬁrm’s portfolio choice of borrowing sources. Von Thadden (1995)
pointed out the importance of the bank’s eﬃcient monitoring within the long-term relationships.
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that can produce rents through the continuation of relationships, and the borrower as well
as the bank must again bear non-trivial costs associated with the initial pre-loan evaluation
of the borrower’s risk to reconstruct the relationship-speciﬁc assets in the banking system
(Lummer and McConnel (1989) and Nakashima and Takahashi (2018)).2 Moreover, the
eﬀect of relationship terminations should well reﬂect the characteristics of a banking system
in the economy as the degree and types of ﬁnancial frictions diﬀer depending on the sys-
tem. In this paper, using a large sample of Japanese matched bank-ﬁrm lending data, we
examine the determinants of relationship terminations, which have received little attention
in the literature, particularly by focusing on the roles of bank-side factors and duration of
relationships.
More concretely, we empirically examine the determinants of relationship terminations
by addressing two questions: 1) what factors drive relationship terminations and which
hypothesis is more plausible for explaining a bank’s decision to terminate a relationship;
and 2) when and how does the duration of bank-ﬁrm relationships aﬀect relationship ter-
minations. To this end, we use a loan-level matched sample of Japanese lending banks and
their borrowing ﬁrms over a period of 20 years. Our matched data allow us to track when
a bank-ﬁrm relationship terminated and how long it continued.3 Our analysis also ex-
ploits the fact that the Japanese banking sector fell into a severe ﬁnancial crisis in the late
1990s and the early 2000s. Such drastic changes in ﬁnancial conditions aﬀect banks’ and
ﬁrms’ decisions on whether to terminate their existing relationships. Hence, the inclusion
of sample periods both before and after the late 1990s and the early 2000s enables us to
uncover the characteristics of bank-ﬁrm relationships by conducting a comparative analysis
2 Lummer and McConnel (1989) conducted an event study for borrowing ﬁrms’ equity returns and found
no abnormal returns following the announcement of the establishment of new relationships. Negative
responses occur when a bank initiates relationship terminations. Their results suggest that banks do not
produce information upon ﬁrst contact with a borrower; rather, the bank obtains information about the
borrower through the continuation of the relationship, and thus terminations can signal negative changes
in ﬁrm value to capital markets. Nakashima and Takahashi (2018) empirically examined the eﬀects of
relationship termination on ﬁrm investment. They found that the eﬀects on ﬁrm investment through
reductions in bank lending change due to relationship terminations would be more signiﬁcant than those
through decreases in bank lending within continuing relationships.
3 The calculation of relationship duration is based on matched data from 1978 to 2010. Although we
use data from 1990 for the analysis of the terminations, data from 1978 are used for the calculation of
duration.
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of sample periods, including those that overlap with the ﬁnancial crisis. Our large dataset
from 1990 to 2010 allows us to more comprehensively isolate the occurrence of relationship
terminations.4
To address the ﬁrst question, we begin by examining the association between banks’
capital conditions and relationship terminations in terms of three non-mutually exclusive
explanations for the lending behavior of banks with impaired capital: the capital crunch,
evergreening, and the ﬂight-to-quality hypothesis.5 In the face of Japan’s ﬁnancial crisis
in the late 1990s, some empirical studies, including those by Woo (2003), Watanabe (2007),
and Gan (2007), demonstrated that the Japanese banking sector in this period experienced
a capital crunch, in which many banks restrained their lending.6 On the other hand,
Peek and Rosengren (2005), Watanabe (2010), and Giannetti and Simonov (2013) found
evidence of evergreening and the misallocation of bank loans to distressed ﬁrms in the late
1990s and the early 2000s.
Almost all prior studies on the lending behavior of impaired banks investigated bank
loan changes in continuing bank-ﬁrm relationships (Peek and Rosengren (2005), Gan (2007),
and Giannetti and Simonov (2013)), or investigated them without distinguishing between
loan changes in continuing relationships and in relationship establishments and termina-
tions (Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007; 2010)).7 However, as discussed above, we have the
legitimate expectation that the intensive and extensive margins of bank loan adjustments
are quite diﬀerent. For example, even if impaired banks lent more to distressed borrow-
ers because of the soft-budget problem (Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Bolton and
4 It is diﬃcult to construct a matched sample of banks because of numerous mergers and acquisitions
(hereafter, M&As) and divestitures in Japan from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. To deal with this
problem, we carefully constructed our dataset considering all M&As and divestitures of Japanese banks.
See Section 2 and Appendix B for details.
5 In Section 3, we deﬁne each hypothesis formally. For a theoretical study of impaired banks’ lending
behavior, see e.g. Besanko and Kanatas (1996), Thakor (1996), Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), Calomiris
and Wilson (2004), and Diamond and Rajan (2000; 2011).
6 For empirical studies of capital crunches in the US, see Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren
(1995), and Berrospide and Edge (2010).
7 Peek and Rosengren (2005), Gan (2007), and Giannetti and Simonov (2013) used matched datasets of
Japanese banks and borrowing ﬁrms; hence, their analysis of bank lending focused on the intensive margin
of bank loans. On the other hand, Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007; 2010) used a bank-level panel dataset;
consequently, their analysis did not distinguish between the intensive and extensive margins of bank loans.
On the other hand, Sekine et al. (2003) and Caballero et al. (2008) used a ﬁrm-level panel dataset to
examine forbearance lending and its macroeconomic eﬀect in Japan, respectively.
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Scharfstein (1996)) or the impaired banks’ window-dressing motives (Peek and Rosengren
(2005) and Bruche and Llobet (2014)), once they decided to terminate such relationships,
they could preferentially choose the relationships with their non-distressed ﬁrms in order
to reduce the agency cost to control borrowers’ projects through monitoring (Bernanke and
Gertler (1989; 1990)). Indeed, through formal testing, we found evidence of a capital crunch
as well as ﬂight-to-quality behavior in distressed banks in relationship terminations, as the-
oretically predicted in Bernanke et al. (1996) and Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997). That is,
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, when the Japanese banking system was in severe dis-
tress, impaired banks were more likely to terminate relationships than non-impaired ones;
however, impaired banks’ relationships with good-quality borrowers were more likely to be
maintained than the non-impaired banks’ ones, because of their motives to reduce agency
costs. Our ﬁnding implies that impaired banks tended to keep more secured relationships,
and hence “misallocation” by impaired banks in the bank loan market is not supported in
relationship terminations.
Our interpretation of the empirical results from our termination analysis is based mainly
on a “lender-driven termination view,” which assumes that lender-side factors, such as
banks’ managerial decisions and capital conditions, lead to relationship terminations. Such
a bank-side view is consistent with theoretical models emphasizing the role of agency costs
in the bank loan market (Diamond (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989; 1990), Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997), and Hellwig (2000)). On the other hand, it is possible that a ﬁrm
could initiate terminations for various reasons. We empirically examine which factor is
more dominant by employing the double ﬁxed eﬀect (hereafter, FE) approach developed
by Jime´nez et al. (2014), which allows us to ingeniously identify the total loan demand
and supply factors using loan-level matched data. Thus, we ﬁnd that not only during the
ﬁnancial crisis period, but also during the (normal) non-crisis period, the contribution of
the bank factor is about 80 to 85 percent in explaining relationship terminations, while that
of the ﬁrm factor is only about 5 to 10 percent. This ﬁnding supports the lender-side view
of relationship terminations, thus providing an insight into the causes of terminations: the
worsening of banks’ capital conditions would boost such lender-driven terminations, while
forcing impaired banks to sort out the good risks from the bad in the ﬂight to quality
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because of the banks’ motive of reducing agency costs. In other words, we show that
banks’ decisions become more important for terminations when their balance sheets are
impaired.
This mechanism of relationship terminations can be explored in more depth in terms
of the duration of bank-ﬁrm relationships. Ongena and Smith (2001) and Miyakawa
(2010) empirically examined the termination of lender–borrower relationships by focus-
ing on whether a longer duration decreased the likelihood of terminating relationships.
Ongena and Smith (2001) found that more relationships would terminate as their dura-
tions increased using a matched sample from Norway. They attributed this result to ﬁrms’
caution about the hold-up problem resulting from long-term relationships. Their inference
is consistent with a “borrower-driven termination view” emphasizing that a ﬁrm could
initiate relationship terminations, and also with Mankiw’s (1988) critique: “why, if these
long-term relationships are so valuable, ﬁrms do not develop them with lenders”. How-
ever, in contrast to them, Miyakawa (2010) presented evidence against hold-ups: fewer
longer relationships were terminated in a matched sample in Japan from 1999 onwards.
Like Miyakawa (2010), we also use a matched sample for Japan, but our analysis covers
a more recent sample period to 2010. Thus, our analysis of the duration eﬀect produces
the same result and implication for the non-crisis period as Miyakawa (2010), but not for
the ﬁnancial crisis period. Our results show that under normal economic conditions, a
relationship-speciﬁc value existed in every Japanese bank-ﬁrm relationship and increased
with duration, as the agency cost declined with duration (Sakai et al. (2010)) and the
hold-up problem was not aggravated in long-term relationships, as argued by Miyakawa
(2010); however during the ﬁnancial crisis, this duration eﬀect weakened, because many
Japanese banks facing impaired capital were prompted to reduce agency costs and could
not aﬀord to maintain relationships with distressed borrowers irrespective of duration.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology for estimation of
the termination function and describes our loan-level matched dataset. Section 3 formal-
izes the three hypotheses of banks’ decisions on relationship terminations and the predicted
eﬀects of ﬁrm factors using microeconomic banking theory. Section 4 reports the estima-
tion results for the termination function. In this section, we also examine which of the
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three scenarios is more plausible for explaining relationship terminations between impaired
banks and borrowing ﬁrms by testing the capital crunch, evergreening, and ﬂight-to-quality
hypotheses. Section 5 examines the duration eﬀect on the termination of bank-ﬁrm rela-
tionships. In Section 6, we extend our termination analysis by controlling for lender- and
borrower-side factors more thoroughly. Furthermore, we identify the contribution of lender-
and borrower-side factors and thereby examine whether relationship terminations are af-
fected more by bank or ﬁrm factors. Section 7 provides concluding comments. Appendix A
explains how we deﬁne a relationship termination in the cases of M&As, business transfers,
and divestitures. Appendix B shows and discusses the estimation results of the termination
model for the ﬁrm variables in more detail.
2. Estimation Model and Matched Data We examine what factors contribute to
the termination of relationships between Japanese banks and their borrowers by using not
only lender-side but also borrower-side attributes with the loan-level matched data. To
this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne termination of a bank-ﬁrm relationship, and then introduce our
estimation model and empirical methodology. We then describe the construction of our
dataset, before deﬁning a new relationship as well as ﬁrm and bank variables included in
the estimation model.
2.1. Estimation Model and Method We deﬁne a termination of a relationship in
ﬁscal year t as a case where ﬁrm i borrows from bank j at the end of year t − 1 but not
at the end of year t. To examine what factors contributed to relationship terminations
between Japanese banks and their borrowers, we employ a probit model. Speciﬁcally, we
deﬁne a termination function of bank–borrower relationships as follows:
TERMijt = 1 [yijt ≥ 0] ,
yijt = a+FIRM
′
it−1b+BANK
′
jt−1c+RELATE
′
ijt−1d+DURATION
′
ijt−1f + ijt, (1)
ijt ∼ N(0, 1),
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where TERMijt denotes a termination dummy variable that takes the value one if the
relationship between ﬁrm i and lending bank j terminates in year t.
FIRMit−1 and BANKjt−1 are covariate vectors including observable characteristics of
ﬁrm i and lending bank j at the end of year t− 1, respectively. RELATEijt−1 include the
relationship factors that capture the characteristics of a relationship between lending bank j
and its borrowing ﬁrm i at time t−1. To highlight the importance of a duration eﬀect on the
probability of termination in our study, the termination function (1) is explicitly written
with a vector of duration dummy variables, DURATIONijt−1. The duration dummies
indicate the number of years the relationship between lending bank j and its borrowing
ﬁrm i has existed up to year t− 1.
In addition to the probit model, we also employ a logit model. However, because the
estimation results are qualitatively the same, we report only the estimation results based
on the probit model. In Section 6, we also employ a linear probability model with bank
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and thus attempt to show the robustness of the estimation results
based on the probit model.
As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of our analysis is to examine what fac-
tors determine relationship terminations. However, we should not exclude the possibility
that the eﬀect of each factor on terminations is time varying, as the Japanese regulatory
system as well as macroeconomic and ﬁnancial conditions have changed drastically over
time.8 Accordingly, it would be best to incorporate the possible time-varying eﬀects of
each factor. To this end, we adopt the strategy of a period-by-period estimation of the
termination function. Such a rolling estimation strategy allows us to control for period-by-
period changes in the macroeconomic environment, thus avoiding misspeciﬁcation of the
termination mechanism. We employ this empirical strategy in the following analysis of
relationship termination.9
8 For example, in terms of a credit crunch study in Japan, Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007) found that
after 1998, the stipulated capital asset ratio was associated with the growth rate of bank loans, whereas
this did not matter previously.
9 Previous studies on relationship terminations, including those by Ongena and Smith (2001) and
Miyakawa (2010), arbitrarily selected a sample period and then applied a non-rolling estimation approach
to the entire sample period. Given that lending banks and their borrowing ﬁrms are expected to change
their relationships according to changes in the macroeconomic environment, the non-rolling estimation
approach based on an arbitrarily selected sample period can provide imprecise estimates of covariates, thus
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2.2. Construction of Loan-level Matched Sample We use a loan-level dataset: a
matched sample of Japanese banks and their listed borrowing ﬁrms. Our loan-level data
are constructed using the Corporate Borrowings from Financial Institutions Database com-
piled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. This Nikkei database collects information on corporate
borrowings (long-term debt with a maturity of more than one year and short-term debt
with a maturity of one year or less) classiﬁed by each Japanese bank. This Nikkei database,
compiled through original Nikkei research, includes about 500,000 observations consisting
of more than 100 Japanese banks, 2,000 listed borrowing ﬁrms, and 18,000 banking re-
lationships for our sample period from 1990 to 2010 (see Table 1). The reason that we
extended the sample to 2010 is that many relationships were found to be missing in the
Nikkei database for the sample period after 2010, primarily because of changes in the data
collection methods of Nikkei Digital Media Inc.
We combined the Nikkei database with ﬁnancial statement data of Japanese banks and
their listed borrowing ﬁrms, compiled by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. Japanese banks’ ﬁscal
year ends on March 31; however, the ﬁscal years of their borrowing ﬁrms do not necessarily
end on the same date. When combining the Nikkei database with the ﬁnancial statement
data, we match bank-side information to borrower-side information in the same ﬁscal year.
Our loan-level dataset has two types of selection bias. One arises from the exit of some
domestic listed companies from our loan-level data, for example, because of bankruptcy or
a management buyout. We are not able to identify the reasons why listed companies exited
from our dataset. To deal with such potential bias, we adopt the strategy of excluding
ﬁrms from our sample in year t when the ﬁrm became unlisted between the end of year
t− 1 and t. In the estimation of the termination function, this strategy might lead to the
underestimation of borrower-side eﬀects on terminations.
A second bias is related to a bank’s survivorship. The Japanese banking sector experi-
enced a wave of M&As, business transfers, and divestitures from the late 1990s to the early
2000s. To construct our loan-level data set, we scrutinized whether continuing banks took
over the credit claims of merged or failed banks against their borrowing ﬁrms before and
after the relevant M&A, business transfer, or divestiture. Appendix A explains how we
resulting in a misunderstanding of a bank’s and a ﬁrm’s decisions on relationship terminations.
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deﬁne the termination indicator and the duration of a bank-ﬁrm relationship in the cases
of M&As, business transfers, and divestitures in more detail. s A failure to track a credit
claim transfer appropriately will lead to excessive counting of terminations. To mitigate
this problem and to control for banks’ business restructuring eﬀects on terminations, we
include seven dummy variables in termination function (1) for M&A, nationalization, pri-
vatization, business transfer, change in corporate name, coming under a ﬁnancial holding
company, and divestiture. 10
2.3. Termination and New Relationships In addition to a terminated relationship,
we identify all “new relationships” and thereby examine whether a ﬁrm that established a
new relationship in year t− 1 is more likely to terminate other relationships in year t. Our
measure of new relationships also includes one where a terminated relationship is revived.
In this paper, however, we do not distinguish between these two. In other words, a new
relationship in year t is simply deﬁned as a case where ﬁrm i borrowed from bank j at the
end of year t but had not borrowed from that bank at the end of year t−1. Figure 2 shows
the historical paths of the various indicators.
3. Bank, Firm and Relationship Factors and Testing Hypotheses In this sec-
tion, we deﬁne bank, ﬁrm, and relationship factors included in the covariate vectors,
FIRMit−1, BANKjt−1 and RELATEijt−1, thereby providing a more concrete speciﬁca-
tion of the termination function (1) as our baseline termination model. In addition, we
formalize three hypotheses, namely capital crunch, evergreening, and ﬂight to quality, and
explain the predicted signs of the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm covariates.
3.1. Bank Factors and Three Hypotheses: Capital Crunch, Evergreening, and
Flight to Quality The bank covariates, BANKjt−1, include a variable typically char-
acterizing banks’ ﬁnancial fragility to investigate how banks’ ﬁnancial conditions aﬀect
the probability of termination. To this end, we include the one-period lag of the book
leverage ratio (BLEVjt−1), deﬁned as 100 ×
(
Book Value of Total Debt
Book Value of Total Assets
)
. In addition to this
ratio, we also use the lowly capitalized bank dummy (LOWCAPjt−1), the market lever-
10 In this paper, we treat banks under the same ﬁnancial holding company as diﬀerent banks.
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age ratio (BMLEVjt−1), and the non-performing loan ratio (NPLjt−1), thus conducting a
robustness check on the estimation results for the leverage ratio. The lowly capitalized
bank indicator, LOWCAPjt−1, is a dummy variable indicating whether each bank’s capi-
talization is low. More speciﬁcally, following Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Giannetti
and Simonov (2013), if a bank’s reported capital ratio based on the BIS banking regu-
lation is less than 2% points above the target capital ratio (8% for international banks
and 4% for domestic banks), we conjecture that the bank’s capitalization is low; that is,
LOWCAPjt−1 = 1, else LOWCAPjt−1 = 0. Note that after 2006, almost all banks have
a zero value for the lowly capitalized bank indicator, and hence we conduct an estima-
tion with this indicator to 2005. The market leverage ratio, BMLEVjt−1, is deﬁned as
100 ×
(
Book Value of Total Debt
Market Cap + Book Value of Total Debt
)
. The non-performing loan ratio of bank j is de-
ﬁned as the ratio of outstanding non-performing loans over total loans. Using these three
variables, instead of the bank book leverage ratio as a bank capital condition variable, we
estimate the baseline termination model to address the capital crunch scenario.
The coeﬃcient of the banks’ ﬁnancial health indicators, including the bank leverage
ratio, can either be positive or negative. It would be positive when Japanese banks’ ﬁnan-
cial health deteriorates and the Japanese banking system is subject to a capital crunch.
According to Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007), many Japanese banks were in a badly
impaired capital state in the late 1990s and this severely constrained the supply of bank
credit. However, in the literature, the capital crunch scenario is used to explain the lending
behavior of lowly capitalized banks in continuing relationships (Gan (2007)), or to do so
without distinguishing loan changes in continuing relationships from relationship establish-
ments and terminations (Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007)). In this paper, we extend the
capital crunch hypothesis to relationship terminations: in this scenario, a lowly capitalized
bank is likely to terminate the relationships with its borrowing ﬁrms, whether the ﬁrms
are distressed or not. Thus, if the relationship termination can be ascribed to the capital
crunch, the expected sign for the coeﬃcient on the bank book leverage ratio is positive.11
On the other hand, in some periods including a non-ﬁnancial crisis or an economic boom,
11 If we use the capital asset ratio as an indicator of banks’ ﬁnancial condition instead of the book leverage
ratio, the expected sign of the capital-asset ratio is negative under the capital crunch hypothesis.
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it is possible that banks with higher leverage could take more credit risks, as demonstrated
by Adrian and Shin (2010). In this case, our expected sign is negative because highly lever-
aged banks or banks that take more risks will decide to preserve their existing relationships
rather than to terminate them.
According to Peek and Rosengren (2005), a lowly capitalized Japanese bank whose
reported capital ratio was close to the target capital ratio stipulated by the BIS regulation
was more likely to evergreen loans to unproﬁtable ﬁrms in continuing relationships because
of its window-dressing motives.12 Evergreening of relationship termination assumes that
banks with low capitalization are more likely to maintain relationships with their distressed
borrowing ﬁrms than with non-distressed ones.
The ﬂight-to-quality scenario makes opposite assumptions to the evergreening scenario.
According to Bernanke et al. (1996) and Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), it assumes that
lowly capitalized banks are more likely to maintain relationships with non-distressed ﬁrms
than with distressed ones; thus, the lowly capitalized banks suppress agency costs by con-
trolling borrowers’ projects through monitoring. It is noteworthy that the ﬂight-to-quality
scenario is incompatible with the evergreening one in relationship terminations; however,
it may coexist with the evergreening behavior of an impaired bank’s lending in continuing
relationships. Such an accommodation is based on our presumption that the reasoning be-
hind a bank’s decision in relationship terminations should be diﬀerent from that in lending
on the premise of the continuation of existing relationships, as discussed in the introduction.
To assess the two mutually exclusive hypotheses—evergreening and ﬂight to quality—of
relationship terminations, we include the interaction term (LOWCAP×FROAijt−1) of the
lowly capitalized bank indicator and the borrowing ﬁrm’s return on assets (hereafter, ROA)
or the highly leveraged bank indicator and the ﬁrm’s ROA (HBLEV×FROAijt−1) together
with each bank’s capital indicator into the baseline model (1). The highly leveraged bank
indicator, HBLEVjt−1, is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the book leverage
ratio is in the highest tertile, and zero otherwise.
12 Window-dressing behavior means that a lowly capitalized bank is reluctant to allow less proﬁtable
ﬁrms to go bankrupt because bankruptcy would force this bank to disclose the resulting impaired capital
at an even lower level. In addition, see Watanabe (2010) and Giannetti and Simonov (2013) for empirical
studies on the evergreening of bank credit in Japan.
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We formalize the three hypotheses on the basis of average marginal eﬀects (hereafter,
AMEs) using the probit model described in equation (1). First, we denote the AME of a
discrete variable z as follows:
AME(z) = Ex [Pr(TERMijt = 1|z = 1, X = xijt)− Pr(TERMijt = 1|z = 0, X = xijt)] , (2)
where Ex[s] denotes the expected value of random variable s over x. For a continuous
variable z,
AME(z) = Exz
⎡
⎣∂Pr(TERMijt = 1)
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=zijt,X=xijt
⎤
⎦ , (3)
where X denotes all covariates except for y. Then, we deﬁne the capital crunch hypothesis
as a case where the following condition holds:13
AME(LOWCAP) > 0. (4)
In other words, a change in the LOWCAP variable from zero to one should be associated
with an increase in the termination probability on average to support the capital crunch
hypothesis.
A ﬂight to quality is demonstrated when we have:
AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) < 0, (5)
and
AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) < AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 0), (6)
where AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) denotes an AME of the ﬁrm ROA for relationships
with lowly capitalized banks (LOWCAP = 1). Equation (5) means that an increase in
ﬁrm ROA lowers the termination probability for lowly capitalized banks. Equation (6)
13 When using the highly leveraged bank indicator, HBLEVjt−1, as a proxy for bank ﬁnancial health, we
substitute HBLEV for LOWCAP.
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means that the marginal eﬀect of ﬁrm ROA is greater for such banks than for others; that
is, lowly capitalized banks were more likely to maintain relationships with ﬁrms of high
proﬁtability than non-lowly capitalized banks. If these two conditions hold, the ﬂight-to-
quality hypothesis is supported.
In contrast, we deﬁne the evergreening behavior of lowly capitalized banks as follows:
AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) > 0, (7)
and
AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) > AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 0). (8)
Note that we do not distinguish between these two scenarios on the basis of the sign of
the AMEs of the ﬁrm ROA for non-lowly capitalized banks, AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 0).
Instead, we only ensure that non-lowly capitalized banks behave diﬀerently from lowly
capitalized ones in these two hypotheses, as formalized in equations (6) and (8).14
In addition to the bank ﬁnancial indicator, we include a major bank dummy variable
(MAJORjt−1) and a size variable (BSIZEjt−1). The major bank dummy variable equals one
if bank j is a city bank or long-term bank, and zero otherwise. Bank size is calculated as
the logarithm of the book value of total assets.
3.2. Firm Covariates and Agency Costs For ﬁrm factors FIRMit−1 to be con-
trolled for, we consider 10 characteristics of ﬁrms: book leverage ratio (FLEVit−1), liquid
asset ratio (FLIQUIDit−1), volatility of assets (σA,it−1), return on assets (FROAit−1), sales
growth (FSALEit−1), ﬁrm size (FSIZEit−1), ﬁrm age (FAGEit−1), the ﬁrm marry dummy
(FMARRYit−1), the ﬁrm termination dummy (FTERMit−1), and the industry dummy vari-
ables (INDUSTRYi).
The information monopoly model of Rajan (1992) predicts that as ﬁrm performance—
14 Furthermore, note that a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction term is not always associated with
one of the two hypotheses in a nonlinear model. This is because equations (6) and (8) can hold even if
the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. This econometric problem involving an interaction
term in a nonlinear model is well known in the literature (see Ai and Norton (2003)).
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ﬁnancial condition (FLEVit−1 and FLIQUIDit−1), business uncertainly (σA,it−1), and prof-
itability (FROAit−1)—improves and ﬁrm size (FSIZEit−1) increases, a bank’s monopoly
power decreases; hence, a well-performing large ﬁrm can take the initiative in terminat-
ing relationships. This view emphasizes a borrower’s decision as the main determinant of
relationships. In contrast, the agency cost model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989; 1990)
and Bernanke et al. (1996) predicts that a good-quality ﬁrm with good solvency can lower
agency costs or the cost of controlling the ﬁrm’s project through monitoring; thus, banks
will choose to maintain relationships with such a good-quality ﬁrm. Their agency cost
model also predicts that as ﬁrm size (FSIZEit−1) and ﬁrm age (FAGEit−1) increase, the
agency costs of the ﬁrm decrease; hence, it would induce banks to maintain relationships
with larger and older ﬁrms (see also Cerasi and Daltung (2000) and Sakai et al. (2010) for
the eﬀect of size and age on agency costs).15
The book leverage ratio of borrowing ﬁrms is constructed in the same way as those of
banks. The volatility of ﬁrm assets is deﬁned as σA = σE× Market Value of EquityMarket Value of Firm . The market
value of a borrowing ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of the market value of equity and the book
value of total liabilities. The market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the stock
price at the end of year t − 1 by the number of shares. To estimate the volatility of the
equity valuation σE , we calculate the standard deviation of the market value of equity for
the last month of a ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year, and then express the estimated volatility at annual
rates.16
ROA is constructed by dividing a ﬁrm’s net proﬁts by the book value of its total assets,
expressed in percentage terms. Firm size is deﬁned as the logarithm of a ﬁrm’s book value
15 Cerasi and Daltung (2000) theoretically predicted that banks may prefer to focus their lending on
larger ﬁrms, because such ﬁrms tend to have more diversiﬁed businesses and thus it allows banks to reduce
agency (monitoring) costs without reducing the diversiﬁcation in their lending. Sakai et al. (2010), using a
data set of small Japanese ﬁrms, found that surviving ﬁrms’ borrowing costs declined as they aged, because
Japanese banks learned about the quality of the surviving ﬁrms during the long-term relationships.
16 More speciﬁcally, we calculate the annualized estimated volatility of the market value of equity as in
σE,it =
√√√√√ 1
20− 1 ×
d(t)∑
k=d(t)−19
(
retk − retd(t)
)2 ×√240,
where d(t) denotes the last trading-day of ﬁrm i’s ﬁscal year t. retk denotes the daily rate of change in
equity valuation, and retd(t) is the average rate of change in equity valuation for the previous 20 days.
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of assets. Firm age is deﬁned as the number of years that have elapsed up to ﬁscal year t
since borrowing ﬁrm i started business. Firm sales growth is calculated as the growth rate
of gross sales. The ﬁrm liquid asset variable is deﬁned as the ratio of liquid assets to total
book value of assets.
FTERMit−1 denotes the one-period lagged value of a ﬁrm termination indicator, which
takes the value one if any of ﬁrm i’s relationships with its lending banks terminated in year
t − 1. The marry dummy variable (FMARRYit−1) is an indicator variable that takes the
value one if ﬁrm i established a new relationship or revived a terminated relationship in
year t− 1.17
INDUSTRYi is the industry dummy variable indicating the industry to which borrowing
ﬁrm i belongs. We use industry dummy variables for each of the 33 industries deﬁned by
Japan’s Securities Identiﬁcation Code Committee.
In addition to the 10 borrower-side factors, we include funding source variables to con-
trol for the dependence of a ﬁrm’s funding on alternative funding sources such as equity and
corporate bonds. This is because a ﬁrm’s dependence on funding sources aﬀects the sig-
niﬁcance of the relationship to the ﬁrm. According to the information monopoly theory of
Rajan (1992), by issuing corporate bonds, ﬁrms are less dependent on bank loans, thereby
terminating more relationships. In contrast, agency cost theory predicts that in Japan’s
arm’s-length debt market, where Japanese ﬁrms cannot easily issue corporate bonds and
commercial paper without higher solvency, Japanese banks will choose to continue rela-
tionships with such higher-solvency ﬁrms because of lower agency (monitoring) costs (see
Nakashima and Saito (2009) for a survey on the corporate bond market in Japan).
17 According to Lummer and McConnel (1989), a termination of ﬁrm i’s relationships signals a negative
change in its ﬁrm value from the perspective of ﬁnancial markets, but a relationship establishment does
not signal any change in the ﬁrm value. Given this ﬁnding, the agency cost view expects the sign of
the coeﬃcient for FTERMit−1 to be positive, and for FMARRYit−1 to be zero, because the continuing
banks would terminate a relationship with a value-declining ﬁrm that experienced a termination in the
previous year, and a ﬁrm’s relationship establishment in the previous year would not aﬀect the continuing
banks’ decisions about whether to terminate or continue the relationship with this ﬁrm. However, under
the information monopoly view, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient for FTERMit−1 is negative, and for
FMARRYit−1 is positive; this is because a value-declining company that experienced a termination in the
previous year is less likely to switch relationships, and a ﬁrm that diligently switched relationships is more
likely to search for a loan rate from a new bank that is lower than the rates from the ﬁrm’s current banks
(see Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)).
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We consider four funding sources in this paper: equity, bank loans, corporate bonds, and
commercial paper. For a capital increase of borrowing ﬁrm i, we use the equity increase
dummy variable (EQUITYit−1) that takes the value one if the number of issued stocks
increases in ﬁscal year t − 1. For the remaining four funding sources, we normalize each
of them by the ﬁrm’s book value of total liabilities, and then calculate the one-period lags
of the normalized funding variables, corporate bonds (CBit−1), commercial paper (CPit−1),
and bank loans (LOANit−1).
3.3. Relationship Factors and Duration Eﬀects We control for the relationship
factors RELATEijt−1 by including bank j’s lending exposure to ﬁrm i (EXLENDijt−1) and
ﬁrm i’s borrowing exposure to bank j (EXBORROWijt−1). The lending exposure of bank j
to ﬁrm i is calculated as a ratio of the loan to bank j’s total loans in year t− 1, while the
borrowing exposure of ﬁrm i to bank j is calculated as a ratio of the loan to ﬁrm i’s total
loans.18
The theoretical model of Cerasi and Daltung (2000) focused on the possibility that
the agency costs of monitoring additional loans would increase. According to their model,
banks with a lending exposure (EXLENDijt−1) that already monitor a number of borrow-
ers are reluctant to diversify their borrowers (see also Besanko and Thakor (1993) and
Hellwig (1998)); hence, the bank would tend to maintain continuing relationships without
more diversiﬁcation of lending. Regarding the termination eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s borrowing
exposure (EXBORROWijt−1), information monopoly theory (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992),
and Von Thadden (1995)) predicts two opposite situations: lender-driven termination and
borrower-driven termination. The former implies that as a ﬁrm depends more on a partic-
ular bank, the inside bank will lock the ﬁrm into the relationship, while the latter implies
that the ﬁrm would switch to outside banks because of its caution about lock-in (see e.g.
Farinha and Santos (2002) and Ongena et al. (2012) for empirical studies on borrowing
concentration into a particular bank).
18 Peek and Rosengren (2005) focused on the relative importance of a borrowing ﬁrm from the lender’s
viewpoint in estimating their loan supply equation, thus using the bank’s lending exposure with a matched
sample of Japanese banks and their borrowers. From the borrower’s viewpoint, Dass and Massa (2011)
focused on the relative importance of a ﬁrm’s bank loans, using the ﬁrm’s loan-to-asset ratio with US
ﬁrm-level panel data but not using the ﬁrm’s borrowing exposure.
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In addition to the two exposure variables, the termination function (1) includes a third
relationship factor, the duration dummy variables DURATIONijt−1 indicating the dura-
tion of the relationship between lending bank j and its borrowing ﬁrm i at time t − 1.
Following the previous studies of Ongena and Smith (2001) and Miyakawa (2010), we de-
ﬁne the duration of a relationship as the number of years it remains in our dataset. This is
because we cannot observe the true duration of a relationship if it started in a pre-sample
period, before 1978. Hence, we use the duration of each relationship deﬁned in our dataset
as a ﬁrst approximation of the true duration. However, considering the data limitation
related to left censoring in the framework of the baseline model, we deﬁne our duration
dummies as an indicator of a tertile of durations (that is, short-, medium- and long-duration
dummies) in each ﬁscal year, instead of the duration itself. In Section 6, we discuss some
advantages of our methodology in more detail.19
Now, we sum up the covariates included in our baseline termination model—bank
factors consist of the book leverage ratio (BLEVjt−1) or one of the other three bank
balance sheet variables, the major bank indicator (MAJORjt−1) and the bank size vari-
able (BSIZEjt−1). Firm factors comprise the 10 characteristics of the book leverage ratio
(FLEVit−1), liquid assets ratio (FLIQUIDit−1), volatility of ﬁrm assets (σA,it−1), return on
assets (FROAit−1), sales growth (FSALEit−1), ﬁrm size (FSIZEit−1), ﬁrm age (FAGEit−1),
marry variable (FMARRYit−1), ﬁrm termination variable (FTERMit−1), industry dummy
variable (INDUSTRYi); and the four funding variables, equity increase (EQUITYit−1), bank
loan (LOANit−1), corporate bonds (CBit−1), and commercial paper (CPit−1). The relation-
ship factors comprise the bank’s lending exposure to each borrowing ﬁrm (EXLENDijt−1),
the ﬁrm’s borrowing exposure from each lending bank (EXBORROWijt−1), and the duration
dummies (DURATIONijt−1). Table 2 details the descriptive statistics for each covariate.
Table 3 summarizes the theoretical predictions of the eﬀects of the ﬁrm covariates on
relationship terminations based on the agency cost view.
19 In the baseline model, we used duration dummy variables based on the tertile of the duration. However,
even if we use the duration dummy variables deﬁned by the duration year directly, our conclusion does not
change qualitatively.
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4. Estimation Results In this section, ﬁrst, we report the estimation results of our
baseline termination model for all variables apart from the duration dummy variables.
Second, we report the estimation results of our other models to investigate which hypothesis
is supported by the bank-ﬁrm relationship terminations in the banking crisis in the late
1990s and the early 2000s.
4.1. Baseline Model In Figure 3-1, we report the estimation results of the AMEs for
the bank factors. The positive and signiﬁcant estimates for the banks’ book leverage ratio
(BLEVjt−1) from the late 1990s to 2005 indicate that highly leveraged banks were more
likely to terminate the relationships with their borrowing ﬁrms during these periods.20 This
result supports the existence of a capital crunch in relationship terminations at that time.
To show the robustness of our estimation results, in the next subsection we will estimate
the termination model using alternative indicators of a bank’s capital condition.The AMEs
of the major bank indicator (MAJORjt−1) are positive, indicating that city banks and long-
term banks were more likely to terminate relationships than other banks such as local banks.
The estimated AMEs of the bank size variable (BSIZEit−1) are negative for almost all sample
periods, which implies that large banks are less likely to terminate their relationships.
From the estimation results of the bank factors, we can infer that highly leveraged small
banks were more likely to terminate relationships with their borrowers from the late 1990s
to 2005.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the ﬁrm covariates. This table demon-
strates that the estimated AMEs—including those for ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions (FLEV
and FLIQUID), business uncertainty (Firm σ), proﬁtability (ROA and Sales), age (FAGE),
equity issuance (EQUITY), and arm’s-length debt (CB and CP)—support the agency cost
view, although the signs of AMEs for some variables ﬂuctuate. That is, the estimation
results overall support the agency cost theory emphasizing the monitoring costs for banks
20 One can calculate the macroeconomic impact of the bank’s book leverage ratio on relationship termi-
nation by multiplying the estimated marginal eﬀect by the standard deviation of the book leverage ratio.
The marginal eﬀect of the book leverage ratio at its median value of 97% from 1996 to 2005 is estimated to
be 0.5% and the standard deviation from 1996 to 2005 is 3.8%. Hence, the impact of the book leverage ratio
on relationship termination is calculated as 1.9% (= 0.5×3.8) and its magnitude is signiﬁcant economically
if we compare it to the termination rate (deﬁned as the ratio of the number of terminations to the total
number of relationships) of 11% in 1999, at which the number of terminations reached its highest level.
18
to control borrowers’ projects, and are thus consistent with the lender-driven termination
view. Information monopoly theory emphasizing borrowers’ caution about information
lock-in, which is based on the borrower-driven termination view, is not supported. In Ap-
pendix B, we discuss the time-varying developments of the eﬀects in each year, which are
reported in Figures B-1 to B-3.
Furthermore, note that in Table 3 (see Figures B-1 to B-3 for details), the agency cost
eﬀect increased especially during the Japanese banking crisis from the late 1990s to the
early 2000s.
4.2. Banks’ Capital Condition and Relationship Termination In this subsection,
we investigate the eﬀect of banks’ capital condition and its interaction eﬀect with ﬁrms’
characteristics on relationship terminations.
4.2.1. Banks’ Capital Condition In the previous subsection, we found that highly
leveraged banks were more likely to terminate relationships with their borrowing ﬁrms from
the late 1990s to the early 2000s. For the late 1990s, as pointed out by Woo (2003), Gan
(2007), and Watanabe (2007), many Japanese banks suﬀered from badly impaired capital.
Furthermore, the regulatory framework for Japanese banks changed drastically in the late
1990s and early 2000s, forcing banks to write oﬀ bad assets more aggressively.21 Taking
into account our estimation results for the bank book leverage ratio (BLEVjt−1) and the
ﬁndings of previous studies, we can infer that banks facing constraints imposed by statutory
capital requirements were reluctant to maintain relationships with their borrowing ﬁrms in
the late 1990s to the early 2000s. We fortify this inference using the lowly capitalized bank
indicator (LOWCAPjt−1), the market leverage ratio (BMLEVjt−1), or the non-performing
loan ratio (NPLjt−1), instead of the bank book leverage ratio.
Figure 4 shows the estimated AMEs of the alternative bank capital variables, LOWCAP,
BMLEV, and NPL. In ﬁscal years 1990, 1994, 1995, 1997, and 2003, the estimated AMEs
of LOWCAP were positive. The AMEs of the market leverage ratio are estimated to have
signiﬁcantly positive from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. For the non-performing loan
21 See, for example, Sakuragawa and Watanabe (2009) and Nakashima and Takahashi (2018) for detailed
discussions about bank regulation changes in Japan.
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ratio, its AMEs were estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive from the late 1990s to 2001.
From the estimation results for the four bank capital variables (BLEV, LOWCAP,
BMLEV, and NPL), we can conclude that banks’ capital constraints signiﬁcantly aﬀected
relationship terminations in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Our results suggest the
existence of a capital crunch in terms of relationship terminations in the ﬁnancial turmoil
period. In the next subsection, we further study which types of ﬁrms—signiﬁcantly prof-
itable or less proﬁtable—were more likely to face terminations with these lowly capitalized
banks.
4.2.2. Lowly Capitalized Banks and Lowly Proﬁtable Firms In this subsection,
we investigate which of the two scenarios—evergreening or ﬂight to quality—were more
plausible in explaining lowly capitalized banks’ behavior in relationship terminations. To
this end, we include—in addition to a bank capital variable, LOWCAPjt−1 or HBLEVjt−1—
an interaction term consisting of the bank capital variable and borrowing ﬁrms’ ROA,
LOWCAP×FROAijt−1 or HBLEV×FROAijt−1, into the baseline termination model.
Figure 5 shows the estimation results for the AMEs of FROAit conditional on the value
of LOWCAPjt. When focusing on the sign of the AMEs of ﬁrm ROA, we see three distinct
phases in our sample periods, in terms of the interaction eﬀects on the probability of
relationship terminations. The three periods are 1992, 1993–1998, and post-1999.
During the ﬁrst period, by ﬁscal year 1992, the AMEs of ﬁrm ROA for lowly capitalized
banks are positive; however, those for non-lowly capitalized ones are negative. These results
indicate that lowly capitalized banks were more likely to maintain relationships with less
proﬁtable ﬁrms, whereas non-lowly capitalized banks did the opposite.
In contrast, in the second period from 1993 to 1998, the responses of lowly and non-lowly
capitalized banks switched; that is, lowly capitalized banks were more likely to terminate
relationships with less proﬁtable ﬁrms, whereas non-lowly capitalized banks were more
likely to maintain relationships with less proﬁtable ﬁrms.
Finally, in the period after 1999, the estimated AMEs of ﬁrm ROA with both banks
were negative. This implies that the less proﬁtable the ﬁrms were, the more likely they
were to terminate their relationships, whether or not the banks’ capital condition was good.
To formally show the diﬀerence in the AMEs of ﬁrm ROA between lowly and non-lowly
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capitalized banks, we perform a Wald test for the null hypothesis that the two AMEs are
the same. Namely, we test the following null hypothesis:
H0 : AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 1) = AME(FROA|LOWCAP = 0). (9)
Table 4 reports p-values for the χ2 test statistics, indicating that the diﬀerence in the AMEs
of the ﬁrm ROA between lowly and non-lowly capitalized banks was signiﬁcant in 1995,
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2001.
In 1990–1992, the estimated AMEs seemed to support the evergreening behavior of
banks. However, Table 4 indicates that the diﬀerence in the AMEs between lowly and
non-lowly capitalized banks was not signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level in this period.
This implies that, according to our deﬁnition in Subsection 3.1, there is no evidence of the
evergreening behavior that is particular to distressed banks in the early 1990s.
From 1993, the sign of the AMEs of FROA for lowly capitalized banks was negative
and that for non-lowly capitalized banks was less negative or even positive until 2001.
Therefore, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the AMEs between lowly and non-lowly capitalized
banks in Table 4 implies that in these periods, lowly capitalized banks were more likely
to terminate relationships with less proﬁtable ﬁrms than non-lowly capitalized banks. In
other words, the relationships with lowly capitalized banks were more sensitive to a ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability than those with non-lowly capitalized banks in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2001.
These results support the ﬂight-to-quality scenario where lowly capitalized banks prefer
maintaining relationships with more proﬁtable ﬁrms.
Figure 6 illustrates the estimation results obtained by using the highly leveraged bank
variable (HBLEVjt−1) instead of the lowly capitalized bank indicator (LOWCAPjt−1). From
this ﬁgure, we see qualitatively similar results to those from the lowly capitalized bank
indicator although not much diﬀerence is observed as in the results obtained by using the
lowly-capitalized bank indicator.
Table 5 reports the Wald test statistics for the diﬀerence in the AMEs between highly
and non-highly leveraged banks. Table 5 shows that in 1995 and 2003, highly leveraged
banks were more likely to terminate relationships with lowly proﬁtable ﬁrms than non-
highly leveraged banks. We also ﬁnd no evidence for the evergreening scenario for highly
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leveraged banks. For some periods such as 1999, even though the diﬀerence was signiﬁcant,
the AME of the ﬁrm ROA for highly leveraged banks was not signiﬁcant, as shown in Figure
6. This implies that highly leveraged banks were not likely to maintain relationships with
less proﬁtable ﬁrms. Furthermore, in some periods such as ﬁscal year 2004, the diﬀerence
between highly and non-highly leveraged banks was statistically signiﬁcant; however, the
AMEs for highly and non-highly leveraged banks were negative. This indicates that highly
leveraged banks were less sensitive to ﬁrms’ proﬁtability; however, they still tended to
terminate relationships with lowly proﬁtable ﬁrms, which does not support evergreening
behavior under our deﬁnition. This robustness check implies that the evergreening scenario
is not supported, while the ﬂight-to-quality scenario is plausible.
Our estimation results are more supportive of the ﬂight-to-quality scenario, rather than
the evergreening scenario, which Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Watanabe (2010) sug-
gested to understand Japanese banks’ lending decisions from the middle to the late 1990s.
Unlike our study, however, they obtained their result on the basis of the continuation of the
existing relationships between Japanese banks and their borrowing ﬁrms (Peek and Rosen-
gren (2005)) or without considering the diﬀerence between the intensive and the extensive
margins of bank loans (Watanabe (2010)).
Also note that our results supporting ﬂight to quality in the ﬁnancial turmoil period
are consistent with the agency cost eﬀects of ﬁrm factors on relationship terminations (see
Subsections 3.2 and 4.1).22 If we agreed with the ﬁndings of Peek and Rosengren (2005)
and Watanabe (2010), the diﬀerence between our ﬁnding based on relationship terminations
and their ﬁndings would suggest that during a ﬁnancial crisis, lowly capitalized banks are
more likely to increase loans to their unproﬁtable borrowing ﬁrms as long as relationships
continue; however, once they decide to terminate such unviable relationships, they prefer
to break up relationships with their unproﬁtable ﬁrms in order to reduce agency costs, as
theoretically predicted by Bernanke et al. (1996) and Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997).
22 When using the ﬁrm leverage ratio (FLEVit−1), volatility of ﬁrm assets (σA,it−1) or sales growth
rate (FSALEit−1) instead of ﬁrm ROA, we found evidence that lowly capitalized banks terminated more
relationships with low-quality ﬁrms with greater leverage, higher business risks, or lower sales growth, than
those with the high-quality ones.
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5. Banking Crisis and Duration Eﬀect In this section, we investigate duration
eﬀects on relationship terminations, particularly by focusing on banks’ capital conditions.
Ongena and Smith (2001) empirically examined duration time until bank-ﬁrm relation-
ships terminate using survival analysis. They used bank-ﬁrm matched samples from 1979
to 1995 in Norway. Then, they showed that relationships with a longer duration were more
likely to terminate, thus suggesting that the value of the relationship declined over time.
Ongena and Smith (2001) ascribed their ﬁnding to the possibility of a ﬁrm’s apprehension
about a hold-up.
Miyakawa (2010) applied survival analysis to a matched sample of Japanese banks and
their borrowing ﬁrms, whose sample period ran from 1982 to 1999, thereby drawing con-
clusions that were opposite to the ﬁnding of Ongena and Smith (2001); that is, Miyakawa
(2010) demonstrated that bank-ﬁrm relationships with a shorter duration were more likely
to terminate than those with a longer duration. Miyakawa (2010) attributed this empirical
result to the presence of relationship-speciﬁc assets; that is, the continuation of transac-
tions in a particular bank-ﬁrm relationship would facilitate reusability of information and
lowering of the agency costs to control borrowers’ projects, so that it would enhance the
value of that relationship as a relationship-speciﬁc asset.
These two opposing views about the longer duration were based on diﬀerent mechanisms
of a long-term relationship. The empirical results of Ongena and Smith (2001) emphasized
the hold-up problem as the cost of the long-term relationship, while those of Miyakawa
(2010) emphasized the presence of relationship-speciﬁc assets as a beneﬁt of it. Here we
reassess whether a longer duration of bank-ﬁrm relationships is associated with a higher
probability of relationship termination.
The above two studies assumed time-invariant eﬀects of a longer duration; however, our
analysis of duration eﬀects incorporates time-varying duration eﬀects. This is because we
expect duration eﬀects to depend on the condition of credit markets, such as the accessibility
of arm’s-length markets and the competitiveness, tightness, and soundness of the bank loan
market, as shown in existing studies (see Rajan (1992) for the theoretical predictions, and
Degryse and Ongena (2008) for a review of duration eﬀects). In Japan, over the 20 years
of our sample period, drastic changes in the ﬁnancial environment surrounding Japanese
23
ﬁrms and banks have occurred. Therefore, we should be skeptical about time-invariant
duration eﬀects over our sample periods.
To conduct our duration analysis using the duration dummies, DURATIONijt−1, in the
baseline probit model we classify all durations into a tertile group: short-, medium-, and
long-duration dummies.23 We have two reasons for not setting up dummy variables for each
duration year directly. First, we cannot always exactly identify the starting year of each
relationship in our dataset because most relationships commenced before the beginning
of our dataset, or ﬁscal year 1978. Therefore, we are not able to estimate the duration
eﬀects by exactly measuring the duration year of a relationship in terms of the “absolute”
time that elapsed from its start. Hence, we focus on its “relative” duration among all
relationships in our dataset in each ﬁscal year.
The second reason, which is closely related to the ﬁrst, is that our strategy of classifying
duration years into a tertile group allows us to study time-varying duration eﬀects. If we
employed duration-year dummies instead of duration-quantile dummies, we would not be
able to compare duration eﬀects in the 1990s with those in the 2000s. This is because
the use of a raw duration year variable causes the maximum possible duration and the
distribution of the duration variables to change over time because of our data limitation
related to left censoring, which distorts our estimation results.24 In this analysis, the
ﬁrst-quantile duration dummy variable indicates the shortest duration group, while the
third-quantile one is the longest duration group.
5.1. Baseline Model Estimation In this subsection, we report estimates of the du-
ration eﬀects in the baseline probit model. In Section 6, we will use the linear probability
23 Frederiksen et al. (2007) showed that a proportional hazard model reduces to a discrete choice model
with duration dummy variables. To construct the short-, medium-, and long-duration dummy variables,
we deﬁne a quantile on the basis of the maximum duration year instead of the number of observations.
For instance, if the maximum duration is nine years, the ﬁrst quantile group consists of ones with 1–3 year
durations, the second with 4–6 years, and the third with 7–9 years.
24 If we use duration dummies based on a raw duration year in 1990, the longest duration, 12 years,
has the highest density because our original data start in 1978. By construction, relationships for which
the 12-year duration dummy variable equals one include all relationships with a duration of more than
12 years. However, in 2000 for instance, the raw duration dummy variable for a 12-year duration equals
one only if the relationship duration is truly 12 years. Therefore, we cannot deal with a 12-year duration
dummy in 1990 in the same way as for one in 2000.
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model with ﬁxed eﬀects to conduct a robustness check of the duration analysis. Figure 7
shows the estimation results for the AMEs of the second-quantile and the third-quantile
duration dummy variables in which the ﬁrst quantile is set as the reference group. The
left and right ﬁgures plot the estimates of the second- and third-quantile duration dummy
variables, respectively. We can make the following four inferences based on our estimation
results.
First, Figure 7 shows that in the early 1990s, the duration eﬀects of tightening relation-
ships were stable and signiﬁcant; a longer duration of a relationship was associated with
a lower probability of its termination. To see this point more clearly, Figure 8 illustrates
the term structure of duration eﬀects for selected periods. For example, in 1995, longer
duration variables have a signiﬁcantly larger negative value, which implies that longer du-
rations are associated with a lower probability of relationship terminations. This result is
suggestive of the existence of a relationship-speciﬁc value. Furthermore, the result of the
increasing eﬀects of a longer duration coincides with the ﬁndings of Miyakawa (2010). We
should note that the AMEs of the duration dummies are estimated by controlling for other
relationship variables such as the borrowing exposure of a ﬁrm to its lending bank.
Second, the second quantile duration dummy becomes insigniﬁcant in the late 1990s
and the early 2000s, indicating that the duration eﬀect starts to diminish in this period.
From this result, we can infer that the eﬀect of the tight bank-ﬁrm relationship becomes
irrelevant to a small diﬀerence in their duration. As discussed in Subsection 4.1, this period
corresponds to the occurrence of a ﬁnancial crisis and a capital crunch. The deterioration of
banks’ ﬁnancial conditions causes a change in the duration eﬀects. In the next subsection,
we will discuss this point in more detail. The decreasing duration eﬀect is observed more
clearly in Figure 8; for example, in ﬁscal year 2000, the term structure of the duration
eﬀect ﬂattened with the insigniﬁcant second quantile duration variable.
Third, Figure 8 indicates that the term structure of duration eﬀects steepened again
for the period 2004–2007. As in the early 1990s, a longer duration of a relationship implied
a lower probability of its termination. This result means the duration eﬀect was restored
after the ﬁnancial turmoil in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, although the duration eﬀect
substantially weakened at one point. In this period, the Japanese economy and ﬁnancial
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system remained relatively stable and sound. From these results, it is clear that a stable
ﬁnancial system is an important condition for the duration eﬀect to lower the probability
of termination.
Lastly, in 2008 and 2009, the estimates of duration eﬀects increased substantially. Dur-
ing the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the banking function remained relatively sound, which allowed
the eﬀect of longer duration to materialize by mitigating the asymmetric information prob-
lem, as pointed out by Uchino (2013).
5.2. Duration Eﬀect and Bank’s Financial Health The above duration analysis has
the following implications. When a banking system is relatively stable, such as the period
before 1996 and in the mid-2000s in Japan, the duration eﬀect is apparent in the sense that
a longer duration would decrease the likelihood of termination of the relationship between
banks and their borrowers. However, when a banking system is relatively fragile, such as
the period from 1997 to 2003, the duration eﬀect was weakened. Hence, we can deduce
that a relatively stable banking system is an important condition for a longer duration to
decrease the likelihood of the relationship terminating.
To show the robustness of this ﬁnding, we use the lowly capitalized bank indicator,
LOWCAPjt−1, instead of the bank’s book leverage ratio and additionally include its inter-
action terms with the two duration dummies, the second-quantile and the third-quantile
duration dummy variables. If the AMEs of the duration dummy variables for lowly capital-
ized banks (banks of LOWCAPjt−1 = 1) do not have negative estimates only in the banking
crisis period of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and the duration dummies for non-lowly
capitalized banks (banks of LOWCAPjt−1 = 0) have negative ones in the whole sample
period including the banking crisis period, we can infer that the bank’s ﬁnancial health is
an important condition for the duration eﬀect to lower the probability of termination.25
Figure 9 shows the estimation results for the AMEs of the duration dummies for lowly
and non-lowly capitalized banks. It is observed that the AMEs for non-lowly capitalized
banks have signiﬁcantly negative estimates in the banking crisis periods of the late 1990s
25 We also used the highly leveraged bank indicator, HBLEVjt−1, as a proxy for bank ﬁnancial health. We
found that estimation results obtained using the highly leveraged bank indicator did not diﬀer qualitatively
from those obtained using the lowly capitalized bank indicator.
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and the early 2000s, whereas the AMEs for lowly capitalized banks do not.26 This implies
that the duration eﬀects were preserved during the ﬁnancial system turmoil for relationships
with non-lowly capitalized banks.
Our analysis in this subsection supports the suggestion that a relatively stable banking
system, in particular, based on a bank’s ﬁnancial health, is a prerequisite for the existence of
the duration eﬀect, and a longer duration decreases the likelihood of terminating the bank-
ﬁrm relationship. Our duration analysis in this section leads to the inference that Japan’s
banking system took time to cultivate a relationship-speciﬁc asset in every bank-ﬁrm rela-
tionship to lower the agency cost gradually; at the same time, the “partial malfunction” of
this system caused a ﬂight to quality, where many Japanese banks with impaired capital
were prompted to reduce agency costs, and then could not aﬀord to maintain relationships
with distressed borrowers irrespective of duration.
6. Robustness and Extension of Termination Analysis In this section, we extend
the termination analysis in two dimensions. First, we control for lender- and borrower-side
factors more thoroughly to show the robustness of our empirical results thus far. To this
end, instead of the probit model, we use a linear probability model with ﬁxed eﬀects, in
which we control for the total loan supply and demand factors through time*bank and
time*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, we examine to what degree the termination of a bank-
ﬁrm relationship is driven by the bank or the ﬁrm. For this purpose, we compare the
contribution of estimated lender- and borrower-side factors to terminations using the linear
probability model with ﬁxed eﬀects.
6.1. Linear Probability Model with Fixed Eﬀects A distinctive analytical advan-
tage of using loan-level matched data is that one can simultaneously control for the demand
and supply factors in an equation speciﬁed at the loan-level unit. To exploit this analytical
advantage, we included various types of bank and ﬁrm observable covariates in the probit
equation (1) (see Subsection 2.1). However, in this termination equation, we may not have
adequately controlled for lender- and borrower-side factors because of omitted variables.
26 We conducted the Wald test for equality among the AMEs of the duration dummies and the AMEs
of their interaction terms with the lowly capitalized indicator. We found that the equality hypothesis is
rejected at the 10% level of signiﬁcance in 1998, 1999, and 2002.
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To address this potential problem of omitted variable bias, we use the linear probability
model with ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, we attempt to show the robustness of our estimation results
obtained using the probit model.
As discussed in the Introduction, the FE approach was developed in some important
previous studies that used loan-level matched data in order to control for loan demand
and supply factors (see Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jime´nez et al. (2014)). Under this
approach, the total loan demand and supply factors are embodied in ﬁrm i’s and bank
j’s time-variant unobservables, each denoted as FirmFEit and BankFEjt. If the FEs can
fully capture the total loan demand and supply factors, the FE approach would allow us
to identify the eﬀects of bank and ﬁrm observable covariates.
More concretely, we introduce the following two equations to identify the eﬀects of bank
and ﬁrm observable covariates on relationship terminations:
TERMijt = a + FirmFEit +BANK
′
jt−1c+RELATE
′
ijt−1d+DURATION
′
ijt−1f
+BankFEj + ijt, (10)
TERMijt = a + FIRM
′
it−1b+ BankFEjt +RELATE
′
ijt−1d+DURATION
′
ijt−1f
+FirmFEi + ijt, (11)
where TERMijt is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if ﬁrm i borrowed from bank
j at the end of year t− 1 but not at the end of year t.
Equation (10) is the termination equation that disentangles the eﬀects of bank observ-
able covariates (BANKjt−1) from those of the total ﬁrm-side factors speciﬁed as the ﬁrms’
ﬁxed eﬀects (FirmFEit). However, equation (11) is the termination equation that disentan-
gles the eﬀects of ﬁrm observable covariates (FIRMit−1) from those of the total bank-side
factors speciﬁed as the banks’ ﬁxed eﬀects (BankFEjt).
The bank observable covariates (BANKjt−1) are composed of the three bank vari-
ables including the bank leverage ratio (BLEVjt−1), while the ﬁrm observable covariates
(FIRMit−1) are composed of the nine ﬁrm variables including the ﬁrm ROA (FROAit−1 )
and the volatility of ﬁrm assets (σA,it−1) and the four ﬁrm funding variables (see Subsec-
28
tions 3.1 and 3.2 for deﬁnitions of all of the bank and ﬁrm variables). In equations (10) and
(11), we also include bank and ﬁrm time-invariant unobservables (BankFEj and FirmFEi)
as well as the bank and ﬁrm observables.
Note that the two termination equations should be speciﬁed in the linear probability
model, and not in the probit model. This is because we cannot employ the FE approach
in the probit model because it cannot exclude the FEs through the within transformation.
The linear probability model with FEs and the probit model are not competing but rather
complementary, partly because the probit model gives a consistent and unbiased estimator
but the linear probability model does not, and partly because the linear probability model
can control for unobserved loan demand and supply factors elaborately, but the probit
model cannot. In the following, given the pros and cons of the two models, we use the FE
approach to show the robustness of the estimation results based on the probit model.
6.2. Robustness of Capital Crunch and Flight to Quality Of the estimated co-
eﬃcients on the bank and ﬁrm covariates in equations (10) and (11), we focus particular
attention on those of the bank leverage ratio (BLEVjt−1) and the ﬁrm ROA (FROAit−1)
in the banking crisis period of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, because the estimated
coeﬃcients on the two variables in this period are very important in our termination anal-
ysis developed in Section 4. Furthermore, instead of the bank leverage ratio, we also use
the lowly capitalized bank indicator (LOWCAPjt−1) as an alternative bank leverage vari-
able in equation (10) (see Subsection 3.1 for the deﬁnition of the lowly capitalized bank
indicator). If the estimated coeﬃcients on the two types of bank leverage variables are
positive and signiﬁcant in equation (10), this implies that banks with greater leverage are
more likely to terminate existing relationships with all types of borrowing ﬁrms. However,
if the estimated coeﬃcients on ﬁrm ROA are signiﬁcantly negative in equation (11), then
a lower level of ﬁrms’ unproﬁtability leads to more relationship terminations regardless of
bank characteristics.
Figure 10 reports the estimated coeﬃcients on the two types of bank leverage variables
in equation (10) (upper panels) and the ﬁrm ROA in equation (11) (lower panel). When
estimating equations (10) and (11), we conducted a rolling linear regression with a ﬁve-year
window. This ﬁgure appears to complement the results obtained in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2:
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the two bank leverage variables have signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients in the banking crisis
period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, though this tendency is more pronounced for
the lowly capitalized bank indicator than for the bank leverage ratio. This conﬁrms the
presence of a capital crunch in relationship terminations. The ﬁrm ROA has signiﬁcantly
negative estimates after the late 1990s, conﬁrming that after the capital crunch, banks
evaluated ﬁrm performance more stringently. 27
Next, in order to conduct a robustness check on the termination analysis of unviable
relationships between lowly capitalized banks and unproﬁtable ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial
turmoil, which was developed in Subsection 4.2, we additionally introduce the following
termination equation:
TERMijt = a + FirmFEit + BankFEjt +RELATE
′
ijt−1d+DURATION
′
ijt−1f
+gFROAit−1 × LOWCAPjt−1 + ijt, (12)
where the variable FROAit−1×LOWCAPjt−1 denotes the interaction term of the ﬁrm ROA
and the lowly capitalized bank indicator. Note that in contrast to equations (10) and (11),
this speciﬁcation controls for both total bank- and ﬁrm-side factors using the double FEs.
An estimated coeﬃcient gˆ on the interaction term measures the diﬀerence of the eﬀects of
ﬁrm proﬁtability on relationship termination between the two cases of LOWCAPjt−1 = 1
and LOWCAPjt−1 = 0.
Figure 11 reports the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms obtained using a
rolling liner regression with a ﬁve-year window for equation (12). This ﬁgure clearly shows
that the interaction term has signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients for the period from 1995 to
1998, and does not have signiﬁcantly estimated coeﬃcients for the other sample periods.
It suggests that as long as lowly capitalized banks led relationship terminations in the late
1990s, in order to reduce agency costs, those banks were more likely to terminate their
relationships with unproﬁtable ﬁrms than those with proﬁtable ﬁrms; that is, the ﬂight-
to-quality behavior of lowly capitalized banks occurred in relationship terminations during
27 When including the volatility of ﬁrm assets (σA,it−1) in equation (11), we found that it had positively
estimated coeﬃcients after the late 1990s, as reported in Table 3 and Figure B-1. This indicates that after
the capital crunch, banks evaluated borrowers’ business uncertainty more stringently.
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the banking crisis period.28
6.3. Duration Eﬀect and Agency Costs In this subsection, we brieﬂy report the
robustness results for the duration analysis developed in Section 5, and then examine the
relationship between duration and borrowing rates.
To conduct a robustness check for the duration analysis, we include the interaction term
of the duration dummies and the lowly capitalized bank indicator (DURATION′ijt−1 ×
LOWCAPjt−1), instead of including the interaction term of the ﬁrm ROA and the lowly
capitalized bank indicator (FROAit−1×LOWCAPjt−1) in equation (12) speciﬁed in the pre-
vious subsection. Thus, Figure 12 shows that the duration eﬀects for non-lowly capitalized
banks (the case of LOWCAPjt−1 = 0) are signiﬁcant even in the banking crisis periods of
the late 1990s and the early 2000s, whereas those for lowly capitalized banks (the cases of
LOWCAPjt−1 = 1) are not for duration dummy 2 (i.e. the dummy variable for the second
tertile of duration) and those for duration dummy 3 (for the longest tertile of duration)
because they become weaker in that period. This conﬁrms that the duration eﬀects are
preserved in the ﬁnancial turmoil period for relationships with non-lowly capitalized banks
and banks’ ﬁnancial health would be a prerequisite for Japan’s banking system to cultivate
bank-ﬁrm relationships over a long period of time, as discussed in Subsection 5.2.
Another important concern for the length of bank-ﬁrm relationships is whether Japanese
banks require an agency premium for a longer duration. If this is the case, ﬁrms have a
strong incentive to initiate terminations in order to avoid a hold-up (see e.g. Degryse and
Ongena (2005) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)); otherwise, a longer duration could help
increase the value of a relationship-speciﬁc asset and lower the agency cost without causing
a hold-up (see e.g. Berger and Udell (1995), Brau (2002), and Sakai et al. (2010)).
Table 6 reports the estimation results obtained by regressing ﬁrms’ borrowing rates on
the duration of the relationships with their main banks. We identify a ﬁrm’s main bank as a
lending bank that has the highest borrowing exposure for the ﬁrm.29 As shown in this table,
28 When including the interaction term of the volatility of ﬁrm assets and the lowly capitalized bank
indicator in equation (12), we found that it had positively estimated coeﬃcients during the banking crisis
period, indicating that lowly capitalized banks were more likely to terminate relationships with ﬁrms facing
higher business risks than those with ﬁrms facing lower business risks.
29 We estimated a pooled regression model for each year separately in order to allow covariates to have
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ﬁrms’ borrowing rates have a negative association with relationship duration, although the
estimates are not signiﬁcant for some periods, implying that a longer duration contributes to
lowering agency costs (ﬁrm’s borrowing) in Japanese bank–borrower relationships. In other
words, the hold-up problem was not the main driving force of relationship terminations in
Japan’s banking system.
6.4. Bank- and Firm-Driven Terminations One critical assumption behind our ex-
planation of all the estimation results is that the eﬀects of the bank leverage ratio and lowly
capitalized bank dummy on relationship terminations in the late 1990s and the early 2000s
reﬂect banks’ managerial decisions after we control for ﬁrms’ other characteristics. More
precisely, our ﬁndings that the capital crunch and the ﬂight to quality of banks prevailed
in those periods is based on the premise that ﬁrms did not take initiative in terminations
depending on these banks’ measures. Here, we show the plausibility of our interpretation
that ﬁrms did not terminate relationships based on those banks’ health, but banks did, by
using termination equations with double FEs.
TERMijt = a + FirmFEit + BankFEjt +RELATE
′
ijt−1d+DURATION
′
ijt−1f + ijt. (13)
In this speciﬁcation with double FEs, we have the advantage that the loan demand and
supply factors (FirmFEit and BankFEjt) can be identiﬁed through a linear regression (see
Jime´nez et al. (2014)); hence, we can decompose and compare the contribution of the
two factors as well as the relationship factors (RELATEijt−1 and DURATION′ijt−1) to
relationship terminations. We exploit such an advantage to examine whether the termi-
nation of a bank-ﬁrm relationship is driven by bank factors or ﬁrm factors, such as their
managerial decisions, ﬁnancial conditions, and proﬁtability.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the contribution of the bank, ﬁrm, and relationship
factors for subsample periods. When calculating the contribution of the three factors, we
standardize each of the contributions so that the three covariances between the termination
variable and each of the three factors sum to one. Hence, this table shows to what degree
a time-varying impact on the borrowing rate. To control other ﬁrm covariates and industry attributes, we
also included all the ﬁrm covariates introduced in Subsection 3.2 and industry dummies.
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the bank, ﬁrm, and relationship factors contribute to the R-squared of the termination
regression (13). Surprisingly, as shown in this table, for all subsample periods the contribu-
tion of the bank factors is calculated to be about 80 to 85 percent, while those of the ﬁrm
and the relationship factors are calculated to be about 5 to 10 percent. This indicates that
relationship terminations are mainly driven by lender-side factors, not only in the ﬁnancial
crisis period, but also in the non-ﬁnancial crisis period.30
6.5. Insight into Relationship Terminations Our analysis in the previous sub-
section demonstrated that relationship terminations are always primarily attributable to
lender-side factors including banks’ managerial decisions and ﬁnancial conditions, and not
to borrower-side ones. Given that relationship terminations substantially increased during
the ﬁnancial crisis period of the late 1990s and early 2000s, as observed in Figure 1, we
can infer that the worsening of banks’ capital conditions would boost such lender-driven
terminations and lead to ﬂight to quality. Under ﬂight to quality, lowly capitalized banks
terminate relationships with low-quality borrowers in order to reduce agency costs, thus
destroying a relationship-speciﬁc asset in a bank-ﬁrm relationship.
This lender-driven termination view also highlights the fact that the information monopoly
of inside banks and the resultant hold-up problem, which emphasizes the negative aspect
of a tight relationship, cannot fully explain actual terminations, at least in the context of
Japan’s bank loan market. This theory predicts that a borrower may initiate terminations
as well as a lender. More concretely, under the information monopoly, a borrower with low
credit risk and high future proﬁtability can initiate a relationship termination to surmount
the hold-up problem, as predicted in Rajan (1992). However, our results for Japan’s bank-
ﬁrm relationships do not support this prediction well: Japanese banks have a tendency
to maintain relationships with borrowers with low credit risks, particularly in periods of
ﬁnancial turmoil. To support the information monopoly theory, low-risk ﬁrms are more
likely to terminate relationships. However, the results show the opposite. These results
implying ﬂight-to-quality behavior in periods of ﬁnancial turmoil cannot be explained with-
30 In a similar way, Amiti and Weinstein (2018) extracted loan demand and supply factors from the same
Japanese matched bank-ﬁrm lending data, albeit unlike ours, their analysis did not pay particular attention
to relationship terminations, or the extensive margin of bank loans. They showed that the loan supply
factors explain 30–40 percent of aggregate loan and investment ﬂuctuations in Japan.
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out introducing the agency cost view, in which lowly capitalized banks are more likely to
display ﬂight-to-quality behavior to reduce agency costs in terminating relationships, as
theoretically predicted in Bernanke and Gertler (1989; 1990), Bernanke et al. (1996), and
Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997). Our empirical results for Japan’s bank loan market are
consistent with this theoretical prediction.
7. Conclusion Using a large matched sample of Japanese lending banks and their
borrowing ﬁrms over 20 years, we examined what factors caused relationships between
lending banks and their borrowers to terminate. This paper draws three main substantive
conclusions about this question.
First, ﬁrm factors have only minor eﬀects on relationship terminations, whereas bank
factors, such as banks’ managerial decisions and ﬁnancial conditions, have major eﬀects.
Such lender-driven terminations are boosted when banks’ capital conditions worsen sub-
stantially, such as during Japan’s banking crisis period. Concretely, the constraints on
bank capital in the banking crisis period increased relationship terminations in the capital
crunch, and also caused ﬂight-to-quality behavior, in which lowly capitalized banks have
the tendency to maintain relationships with good-quality ﬁrms (such as ﬁrms with lower
business uncertainty and higher performance). The ﬂight to quality in relationship termi-
nations is consistent with the agency cost eﬀects; that is, it results from lowly capitalized
banks’ motives to reduce agency costs in the capital crunch.
Second, Japanese banks are more likely to select relationships with older ﬁrms that
use arm’s-length debts (corporate bonds and commercial paper) and have better ﬁnancial
conditions (lower leverage and higher liquidity ratios), lower business uncertainty (lower
asset risks), and higher performance (higher proﬁtability and sales growth). Their eﬀects
are based on banks’ motives to lower agency costs and strengthen performance, especially
during the Japanese banking crisis from the late 1990s to the early 2000s.
Last, when Japan’s banking system is relatively stable, a longer relationship duration
decreases the likelihood of every bank-ﬁrm relationship being terminated. Conversely,
when the system is fragile, the duration eﬀect is diminished. This result is counter to the
hold-up problem and implies that Japan’s banking system took a long time to cultivate
a relationship-speciﬁc asset in all bank-ﬁrm relationships to lower agency costs gradually;
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however, the “partial malfunction” of this system resulted in ﬂight to quality, where many
Japanese banks facing impaired capital were forced to reduce agency costs, and then could
not aﬀord to maintain relationships with distressed borrowers irrespective of duration.
The frequency of relationship terminations is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of a
banking system. Hence, the above conclusions highlight the necessity of a comparative view
of banking systems (Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Allen and Gale (1995; 2001)), because
empirical studies on the Japanese banking system, including Miyakawa (2010), Sakai et al.
(2010), and the present paper, provide evidence against the hold-up problem in long-term
relationships, which is emphasized by, for example, Ongena and Smith (2001), Degryse and
Ongena (2005), and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). Our analysis of relationship banking
should be extended along this line.
Appendix A: Construction of a Loan-Level Matched Sample with M&A, Busi-
ness Transfer, and Divestiture Activity The Japanese banking sector saw signiﬁcant
M&A, business transfer, and divestiture activity over the late 1990s and early 2000s. To
construct our loan-level dataset, we checked whether successor banks took over the merged
or eliminated bank’s credit claims on its borrowing ﬁrms before and after the relevant M&A,
business transfer, or divestiture. This appendix explains how we deﬁne the termination of
a bank-borrower relationship in the case of M&As, business transfers, and divestitures.
The Case of M&As Here, we consider the case of an absorption-type merger. If a
surviving bank takes over a merged bank’s loan lent to a borrowing ﬁrm after the absorption
merger, we assume that the pre-M&A relationship between the merging bank and the
borrowing ﬁrm continues in the post-M&A relationship between the surviving bank and the
ﬁrm. That is, the pre-M&A relationship does not terminate at the time of the absorption
merger. In contrast, if no bank takes over the loan of the merging bank, we assume that
the pre-M&A relationship terminates at the time of the absorption merger.
The Case of Business Transfers Next, we consider the case in which a bank transfers
its business to other banks. In this case, we deﬁne a relationship termination as the case
of an M&A. If we ﬁnd that the transferee bank takes over the loans of the transferor bank,
we assume that the transferor bank also transfers pre-transfer relationships between the
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transferor bank and its borrowing ﬁrms, and that the pre-transfer relationships do not
terminate. As long as we ﬁnd that the transferee banks did not take over the loans of the
transferor bank, we assume that the pre-transfer relationships between the transferor bank
and its borrowing ﬁrms are terminated. We adopt the above way of deﬁning a relationship
termination, whether the accepting banks enjoyed relationships with those borrowing ﬁrms
before the business transfer or not.
The Case of Mergers and Divestitures We consider the case in which banks merge
and then divest. In this case, we should identify which banks formed after the merger and
divestiture, and whether they took over the loans of the merging banks. If a ﬁrm enjoyed
relationships with one of the merging banks before the merger and divestiture, and the ﬁrm
had a relationship with at least one of the surviving banks after the merger and divestiture,
we assume that the relationships between the merging banks and the ﬁrm were preserved.
That is, the relationships did not terminate. If the ﬁrm does not have any relationships
with the surviving banks after the merger and divestiture, we assume that the relationships
between the merged banks and the ﬁrm terminated at that time.
Appendix B: Estimation Results for the Firm and Relationship Factors in the
Termination Model In Subsection 4.1, we brieﬂy reported estimation results for ﬁrm
covariates and pointed out that the results support the agency cost view in terminating
relationships. In this appendix, we report the estimation results in more detail.
Firm Factors Table 3 summarizes the predicted signs of the coeﬃcients based on the
agency cost view and the estimation results. Figures B-1 and B-2 show the estimation
results of the AMEs for the ﬁrm and its funding factors. As shown in Figure B-1, the AMEs
for ﬁrms’ book leverage ratio (FLEVit−1) are estimated to be negative before 1998 and after
the mid-2000s, indicating that highly leveraged ﬁrms are less likely to face relationship
terminations than lowly leveraged ones. In contrast, the AMEs have signiﬁcantly positive
values for some periods in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Given that these periods
correspond to the time when the Japanese ﬁnancial system was in turmoil, this result
suggests that Japanese banks evaluated ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial conditions more stringently for these
periods in order to reduce agency costs. However, in the non-turmoil periods, ﬁnancially
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fragile ﬁrms with greater leverage were more likely to be locked in.
The estimated AMEs for ﬁrm liquid assets (FLIQUIDit−1) indicate that ﬁrms with more
liquid assets were more likely to experience relationship terminations, except for in 1999.
This result underscores the fact that ﬁscal year 1999 was the peak of the banking crisis;
in a normal period, a higher liquid assets ratio would imply more terminations, because
of the weaker lock-in eﬀect, as predicted by information monopoly theory, while in 1999,
ﬁrms with a high liquid assets ratio were able to maintain their relationships with banks
because of the lower agency costs, as predicted by agency cost theory. This ﬁnding for the
ﬁrm liquidity assets is compatible with that for the ﬁrm leverage ratio.
The AMEs of volatility of ﬁrm assets (σA,it−1) is estimated to have signiﬁcantly positive
values from 1998, while the sign of the AMEs was unstable in the early 1990s. This means
that highly volatile ﬁrms were more likely to face relationship terminations after the late
1990s. From these results for the ﬁrm leverage and volatility variables, in the late 1990s and
the early 2000s, ﬁrms with higher risks were more likely to face relationship terminations
than less risky ﬁrms because of Japanese banks’ motives to reduce agency costs, whereas
this was not always the case before.
The estimated AMEs for the ﬁrm ROA (FROAit−1) and the sales growth rate (FSALEit−1)
support the agency cost view; that is, banks selected relationships with highly performing
ﬁrms in order to reduce agency costs. The AMEs for the ﬁrm ROA (FROAit−1) are signiﬁ-
cantly positive in the early 1990s, while they are signiﬁcantly negative after the mid-1990s.
In this latter period, the bank relationships of highly proﬁtable ﬁrms were more likely to
last. With respect to the sales growth rate (FSALEit−1), the estimated AMEs are negative
through all periods except for a few years such as 1994. These negative estimates show that
a ﬁrm’s strong growth was associated with a higher probability of continuing relationships.
The ﬁrm size (FSIZEit−1) has signiﬁcantly positive estimates after 1997, which is not
consistent with the agency cost theory, but rather with the information monopoly theory;
that is, it is more diﬃcult for larger ﬁrms to be locked in.
The ﬁrm age (FAGEit−1) coeﬃcient is negative for almost all sample periods, although
the negative estimates are not necessarily signiﬁcant. These results indicate that a relation-
ship with an older ﬁrm was more likely to continue than one with a younger one, because
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maintaining a relationship with such a long-standing ﬁrm keeps the agency costs down, as
empirically demonstrated in Sakai et al. (2010).
The AMEs of the marry indicator (MARRYjt−1) is signiﬁcantly positive only during
the late 2000s; however, for the overall sample period, the estimates are insigniﬁcant,
indicating that the establishment of a new relationship in the previous year does not aﬀect
the continuing bank’s decision about whether to terminate or continue the relationship
with the ﬁrm that experienced the relationship establishment. The positive AMEs for the
one-period lag of the borrowing ﬁrm’s termination indicator (FTERMit−1) indicate that
borrowing ﬁrms that had experienced a relationship termination in the previous year were
more likely to face the termination of other relationships in the next year. The results
for the marry and the termination indicators support the agency cost view for the overall
sample period.
Figure B-2 presents the estimation results for the ﬁrm funding factors. For the eq-
uity increase dummy variable (EQUITYit−1), the estimates have either positive or negative
values, varying over time. Speciﬁcally, they have signiﬁcantly positive estimates in 1995,
1999, and 2008–2009, indicating that ﬁrms with increasing equity faced relationship termi-
nations. In other words, the bank relationships of ﬁrms that did not increase their equity
were more likely to last. This result implies that bank loans were substitutes for equity in
these periods. The years 1999 and 2008–2009 were times when the ﬁnancial markets were
in turmoil. Therefore, we can infer that ﬁrms that had diﬃculty in issuing equity were
more able to maintain relationships.
Regarding the arm’s length debt, the estimated AMEs for corporate bonds (CBit−1)
and commercial paper (CPit−1) are signiﬁcantly negative in the early 2000s when Japan’s
banking system was fragile, whereas they are positive in the other periods when the system
was stable, albeit not always signiﬁcant. As discussed in Subsection 3.2, only high-solvency
ﬁrms can issue corporate bonds and commercial paper in Japan. The negative estimates
for the ﬁnancial turmoil period support the agency cost view, implying that Japanese
banks selected secured relationships with high-solvency ﬁrms that were able to use the
two debt-funding tools. However, the positive estimates in the pre- and post-ﬁnancial
turmoil period support the information monopoly view, implying that the high-solvency
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ﬁrms issuing corporate bonds and commercial paper were less likely to be locked in during
normal times.
The estimated AMEs for the dependence on bank loans (LOANit−1) indicate that the
more a ﬁrm depended on bank loans, the fewer relationship terminations it faced. The
magnitude of the AMEs is greater for 1999 and 2009–2010. This result suggests that
during a period of ﬁnancial turmoil, the dependence on bank loans accelerated because of
the stronger lock-in eﬀect.
To sum up, in order to reduce agency costs, Japanese banks selected relationships
with longer-established ﬁrms that used arm’s-length debt (corporate bonds and commercial
paper) and have lower business uncertainty (lower asset volatility), and higher performance
(higher proﬁtability and sales growth), while terminating relationships with the other types
of ﬁrms. Also note that such agency cost eﬀects strengthened in the ﬁnancial turmoil period
such as in the late 1990s as the signs of the coeﬃcients on ﬁrm book leverage and liquidity-
asset ratio changed to ones that support the agency cost view.
Relationship Factors For the two relationship factors (see Figure B-3), the coeﬃcients
on ﬁrms’ borrowing exposure (EXBORROWijt−1) are signiﬁcantly negative for the overall
sample period, with the impact being the biggest in 1999. Moreover, banks’ lending expo-
sure (EXLENDijt−1) has signiﬁcantly negative AMEs for the overall period, with the impact
being the biggest in 2004. This implies that an increase in a ﬁrm’s and a bank’s depen-
dence on a particular relationship is associated with a higher probability of maintaining
the relationship, especially during a period of ﬁnancial turmoil.
However, the mechanism of strengthening bank-ﬁrm relationships is diﬀerent between a
bank’s lending exposure and a ﬁrm’s borrowing exposure: the negative AMEs for a bank’s
lending exposure support the agency cost view in which each bank is reluctant to bear the
additional agency costs to diversify lending portfolios, whereas those for a ﬁrm’s borrowing
exposure support the information monopoly view or relationship-speciﬁc asset hypothesis
in which a borrower that depends more on a particular bank is more locked in or beneﬁts
from the relationship.
We report estimation results for the duration dummy variables (DURATIONijt−1) in
Section 5.
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Table 1: Number of Observations: Average per Year
Number of observations Full sample 1990–1999 2000–2010
Firms 1,992 1,792 2,174
Banks 138 150 127
Relations 16,528 19,760 13,411
Notes: This table shows sample averages of the numbers of observations for borrowing ﬁrms, lending
banks, and relationships, each calculated per year. ”Full sample” indicates the sample period from
ﬁscal year 1990 to 2010.
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Table 3: Predicted and Estimated Eﬀects of Firm Covariates on
Relationship Terminations in Terms of the Agency Cost Theory
Predicted eﬀects Estimated eﬀects Periods of largestagency cost eﬀects
Firm factors
Book leverage ratio (FLEV) + + in 1999, 2000 and 2003-2005 1999
Liquidity-to-asset ratio (FLIQUID ) − − in 1997 and 1999 1999
Asset volatility (Firm σ) + + in the overall period 2003
ROA (FROA) − − in the overall period 2003
Sales (FSALE) − − in the overall period 2000
Size (FSIZE) − − through 1996 1993
Age (FAGE) − − in the overall period 2004
New relationship (FMARRY) 0 0 in the overall period -
Lagged termination (FTERM) + + in the overall period 2007
Firm funding factors
Equity Issue (EQUITY) − − except in 1999, 2008 and 2009 2004
Corporate bond-to-debt ratio (CB) − − except in 1995-1997 and 2005 2003
Commercial paper-to-debt ratio (CP) − − except in 2004-2006 2001
Bank loan-to-debt ratio (LOAN) 0 − in the overall period -
Notes: +, –, and 0 in the predicted eﬀects indicate that the agency cost theory predicts that each ﬁrm
covariate has positive, negative, and no simple associations with relationship terminations, respec-
tively. See Subsection 3.2 for the predicted eﬀects of the agency cost theory. The estimated eﬀects
summarize estimated AMEs of each ﬁrm covariate on relationship terminations, which is reported in
Figures B-1 and B-2, obtained by running the rolling estimations of the baseline probit model (1).
The periods of largest agency cost eﬀects indicate a period when an estimated AME of each ﬁrm
covariate becomes the largest in terms of the agency cost eﬀect. See Appendix B for more details on
the estimation results.
Table 4: Wald Test for the Diﬀerence of AMEs of the Firm Return
on Assets between Lowly and Non-Lowly Capitalized Banks
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
p-value 0.76 0.28 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.08* 0.06* 0.86 0.02** 0.96
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
p-value 0.10* 0.03** 0.49 0.13 0.23 0.50
Notes: Using the estimated AMEs of FROA, we conducted a Wald test for the null hypothesis that
the AME for lowly capitalized banks is equal to that for non-lowly capitalized ones. ***, **, *
indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
Table 5: Wald Test for the Diﬀerence of AMEs
between Highly and Non-Highly Leveraged Banks
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
p-value 0.42 0.21 0.35 0.72 0.16 0.01** 0.54 0.98 0.67 0.07*
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
p-value 0.27 0.61 0.73 0.03** 0.02** 0.13 0.95 0.29 0.74 0.21 0.24
Notes: Using the estimated AMEs of FROA, we conducted a Wald test for the null hypothesis that
the AME for highly leveraged banks is equal to that for non-highly leveraged ones. ***, **, * indicate
1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
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Table 6: The Eﬀects of Duration on the Borrowing Rate
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Duration -0.217** -0.227* -0.220** -0.134 -0.0295* -0.0189 -0.0183 -0.00861** -0.0100 -0.00548 -0.00559*(0.106) (0.118) (0.106) (0.0823) (0.0165) (0.0143) (0.0131) (0.00417) (0.00670) (0.00607) (0.00340)
Number of obs. 1424 1455 1504 1553 1568 1584 1613 1973 2185 2115 2112
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Duration -0.00297 -0.00868** -0.000777 -0.00212 -0.00682** -0.00684* -0.00196 -0.00153 -0.000318* 0.000382(0.00467) (0.00414) (0.00288) (0.00349) (0.00344) (0.00367) (0.00346) (0.00384) (0.00200) (0.00278)
Number of obs. 2047 2022 2018 2029 2012 1998 1978 1950 1944 1877
Notes: Estimation results are obtained by regressing ﬁrms’ borrowing rates on the duration of the
relationships with their main banks. We identify a ﬁrm’s main bank as the lending bank that has the
highest borrowing exposure for the ﬁrm. To control other ﬁrm covariates and industry attributes, we
also include all the ﬁrm covariates introduced in Subsection 3.2, and industry dummies. ***, **, *
indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
Table 7: The Contribution of the Firm, Bank and Relationship Factors
to Terminations
Sample Period 1990-1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
Firm factors 0.107 0.107 0.050 0.048
Bank factors 0.815 0.806 0.866 0.853
Relationship factors 0.078 0.086 0.083 0.098
R-squared 0.438 0.440 0.476 0.428
Notes: We calculate the contribution of the ﬁrm, bank, and relationship factors using the linear prob-
ability model with ﬁxed eﬀects (14). Each contribution is standardized so that the three covariances
between the termination variable and each of the three factors sum to one.
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Figure 1. Number of Relationship Terminations, Bank Loans, and GDP 
 
Notes: The number of terminations is calculated by summing all terminations over Japanese listed firms for 
each fiscal year. The growth rate of outstanding amounts of bank loans is calculated as the first log difference 
of outstanding amounts of loans by private financial institutions to private nonfinancial corporations. 
 
 
Figure 2. Terminations, New Relations, and Revivals 
 
Notes: The number of terminations and new relationships is calculated by summing all terminations and new 
relationships over Japanese listed firms. 
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Figure 3. Effects of the Bank Factors in the Baseline Termination Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: BLEV, MAJOR and BSIZE indicate the bank book leverage ratio, the dummy variable of a major bank, 
and the bank size variable, respectively. The solid line indicates a point estimate of the AMEs for each 
covariate and the shaded area shows the 90% confidence interval of the estimate based on the rolling 
estimations of the baseline probit model. 
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Figure 4. Estimated AMEs of the Lowly Capitalized Bank Dummy,  
the Market Capital Ratio, and the Nonperforming Loan Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: LOWCAP, BMLEV, and NPL indicate the lowly capitalized bank indicator, the market capital ratio, 
and the nonperforming loan ratio, respectively. AME indicates the average marginal effect calculated by using 
the estimation results. The solid line indicates point estimates of the AMEs for each bank variable and the 
dotted line indicates the 90% confidence interval of the estimates based on the rolling estimations of 
alternative models where the bank book leverage ratio is replaced with the lowly capitalized bank indicator 
(LOWCAP), the market capital ratio (BMLEV), or the nonperforming loan ratio (NPL). Because after 2006, 
almost all banks have zero values for the lowly capitalized bank variable, the estimation results after 2006 are 
not shown in this figure. 
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Figure 5. Estimated AMEs of FROA for Lowly and Non-Lowly Capitalized Banks 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates point estimates of the AMEs of the firm return on assets (FROA) for lowly 
capitalized banks and the dotted line indicates the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates. The gray bar 
indicates point estimates of the AMEs of the firm ROA for non-lowly capitalized banks with error bars for the 
90% confidence intervals. Because after 2006 almost all banks have zero values for the lowly capitalized bank 
variable, the estimation results after 2006 are not shown in this figure. The results are obtained by the rolling 
estimations of alternative models where the bank book leverage ratio is replaced with the lowly capitalized 
bank indicator and the interaction variable between the lowly capitalized dummy, and the firm ROA is 
included. 
 
Figure 6. Estimated AME of FROA for Highly and Non-Highly Leveraged Banks 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates point estimates of the AMEs of the firm return on assets (FROA) for highly 
leveraged banks and the dotted line indicates the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates. The gray bar 
indicates point estimates of the AMEs for non-highly leveraged banks with error bars for the 90% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 7. Estimated Duration Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates point estimates of the AMEs for the duration dummy variables from the rolling 
estimations based on the baseline probit model and the dotted line indicates the 90% confidence intervals of 
the estimates. To calculate the AMEs, we used the shortest duration group as the reference. 
 
Figure 8. Term Structure of Duration Effects for Selected Period 
 
 
Notes: Each line indicates the point estimates of the AMEs of the duration dummy variable for a specific fiscal 
year from the rolling estimations based on the baseline probit model. 
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Figure 9. Estimated Duration Effects by Bank Capitalization 
 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates point estimates of the AMEs of the duration dummy variables for lowly 
capitalized banks and the dotted line indicates the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates. The gray bar 
indicates point estimates of the AMEs for non-lowly capitalized banks with error bars for the 90% confidence 
intervals. The results are obtained by rolling estimations of alternative models where the lowly capitalized 
bank dummy and the interaction variables between it and the duration dummy variables are included. 
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Figure 10. Estimated Effects of the Bank Leverage Ratio and the Lowly  
Capitalized Bank Indicator in the Linear Probability Model with Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates the point estimates of the coefficients for the bank leverage ratio (BLEV), the 
lowly capitalized bank indicator (LOWCAP), and the firm return on assets (FROA), while the dashed line 
shows the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates based on the rolling estimations of the linear probability 
models (10) and (11). The X-axis indicates the starting year of each subsample period. The plot in year t shows 
the estimate based on the subsample period from years t through t+4. As the lowly capitalized indicator 
(LOWCAP) equals zero almost always after 2005, the estimates after 2005 (i.e. those in 2005--2009 and 2006-
-2010) are not shown in the figure. 
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Figure 11. Estimated Interaction Effects of the firm ROA and the Lowly Capitalized  
Bank Indicator in the Linear Probability Model with FEs 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid line indicates the point estimates of the coefficients for the interaction term of the firm return 
on assets (FROA) and the lowly capitalized bank indicator (LOWCAP), and the dashed line shows the 90% 
confidence intervals of the estimates based on the rolling estimations of the linear probability model (12). The 
X-axis indicates the starting year of each subsample period. The plot in year t shows the estimate based on the 
subsample period from years t through t+4. 
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Figure 12: Estimated Duration Effects by Bank Capitalization 
in Linear Probability Model with FEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid black line indicates the point estimates of the marginal effect of the duration dummy variables 
for lowly capitalized banks and the dotted line indicates the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates. The 
bold green line indicates point estimates of the marginal effect for non-lowly capitalized banks with the blue 
shaded area for the 90% confidence intervals. The results are obtained by rolling estimation of the linear 
probability model with the time-varying bank and firm fixed effects, where the interaction variable between 
the lowly capitalized bank dummy and the duration dummy variables are included. The plot in year t shows 
the estimate based on the subsample period from years t through t+4. 
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 Figure B-1. Effects of Firm Factors on Relationship Terminations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: FLEV, Firm σ, FROA, FSIZE, FSALE, and FAGE indicate the variables for firm book leverage ratio, 
firm volatility, firm return on assets, firm size, sales growth, and firm age, respectively. The solid line indicates 
the point estimates of the AMEs for each covariate and the shaded area shows the 90% confidence intervals 
of the estimates based on the rolling estimations of the baseline probit model.  
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Figure B-1. Effects of Firm Factors on Relationship Terminations (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: FLIQUID, MARRY, and FTERM indicate the firm liquid asset ratio, firm marry indicator, and firm 
termination indicator, respectively. The solid line indicates the point estimates of the AMEs for each covariate 
and the shaded area shows the 90% confidence intervals of the estimate based on the rolling estimations of 
the baseline probit model. 
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Figure B-2. Effects of Firm Funding Factors on Relationship Terminations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: EQUITY, CBOND, CP, and LOAN indicate the equity increase indicator, corporate bonds, commercial 
paper, and bank loan dependence variables, respectively. The solid line indicates the point estimate of the 
AMEs for each covariate and the shaded area shows the 90% confidence intervals of the estimate based on 
the rolling estimations of the baseline probit model. 
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Figure B-3. Effects of Relationship Factors on Relationship Terminations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: EXBORROW and EXLEND indicate the borrowing exposure of firms, and the lending exposure of 
banks, respectively. The solid line indicates the point estimates of the AMEs for each covariate and the shaded 
area shows the 90% confidence intervals of the estimates based on the rolling estimations of the baseline 
probit model. 
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